Este trabajo presenta como objetivo revelar la influencia de los contextos socioeconómicos en las maneras de afrontamiento al cáncer como enfermedad. Se muestra un análisis sobre el cáncer como problema social y de salud; se analiza el papel de algunos entes sociales involucrados, el acceso de los enfermos a las terapias y de los productores de fármacos a las nuevas tecnologías. Se reflexiona acerca de la sobreevaluación de los fármacos que dificulta el acceso a novedosas y efectivas terapias; la supeditación (...) del saber tecnocientífico a los intereses del capital; la creciente contaminación ambiental como detonante al incremento de casos; y la escasez de tecnologías para la prevención y el saneamiento en países subdesarrollados. Finalmente se refiere el programa cubano de lucha contra el cáncer, su situación actual y proyecciones. This paper aimes at revealing the influence of the socioeconomic contexts on the way cancer is faced as a disease. An analysis about cancer as a social and health problem is presented; the role of some social organizations involved the sick's access to therepies and drug producers' access to new technologies. It is reflected on the over-asessment of drugs which makes access to new and effective therapies difficult; the subordination of the technoscientific knowledge to the interests of the capital; the growing environmental pollution as a trigger for cases increase; and the limited technological resources for prevention and cleanup in underdeveloped countries. Finally, it is made reference to the Cuban cancer fighting program, its current status and scope. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo tiene por objetivo exponer cómo la contaduría como profesión puede ampliar su horizonte de reflexión sobre el concepto de bien común fundamentándose en los postulados principales de la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia dentro de su horizonte interpretativo, para lo cual se basa en una metodología cualitativa y un método dialógico fundamentado en la hermenéutica gadameriana. El principal aporte de este estudio es proponer que la contaduría, basada en el bien común desde la Doctrina Social de la (...) Iglesia, tiene que cambiar de paradigma, generar y comunicar información financiera y no financiera orientada hacia todo el hombre y a todos los hombres, y estar orientada hacia la eco-nomía y la eco-logía. Abstract This paper aims to expose how accounting as a profession can broaden its horizon of reflection on the concept of common good based on the main postulates of the Catholic Social Teaching within its interpretive horizon, for which it is based on a qualitative methodology and a dialogic method founded on Gadamerian hermeneutics. The main contribution of this study is to propose that accounting, based on the common good from the Catholic Social Teaching, must change the paradigm, generate and communicate financial and non-financial information oriented towards all man and all men, and be oriented towards eco-nomy and eco-logy. (shrink)

Esta investigación tiene como finalidad responder, desde la filosofía y literatura de Camus, la pregunta de si el hombre puede ser feliz sin Dios. Para llevar a cabo este trabajo, se utiliza un método hermenéutico, pues se hace un acercamiento dialógico y holístico a las obras del pensador argelino para descubrir su pensamiento respecto a Dios y a la felicidad humana. Los principales resultados de la investigación concluyen que el hombre puede ser feliz sin Dios en la medida en que, (...) en primer lugar, acepte el absurdo y viva su rebeldía, y, en segundo lugar, comprenda la felicidad como una vocación ontológica más allá de un estado. (shrink)

Many prominent theories of moral responsibility rely on the notion of “tracing,” the idea that responsibility for an outcome can be located in (i.e., “traced back to”) some prior moment of control, perhaps significantly antecedent to the proximate sources of a considered action. In this article, I show how there is a problem for theories that rely on tracing. The problem is connected to the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. Many prima facie good candidate cases for tracing analyses appear to (...) violate the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. So, either we need to dispense with tracing approaches or we must refine our understanding of the knowledge condition or we are responsible less frequently than we suppose. (shrink)

Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have (...) realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. (shrink)

This article summarizes the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (3) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about (...) moral responsibility. (shrink)

In mid-twentieth-century Mexican philosophy, there was a peculiar nationalist existentialist project focused on the cultural conditions of agency. This article revisits some of those ideas, including the idea that there is an important but underappreciated experience of one's relationship to norms and social meanings. This experience—something called accidentality—casts new light on various forms of social subordination and socially scaffolded agency, including cultural alienation, biculturality, and double consciousness.

In recent years, reflection on the relationship between individual moral responsibility and determinism has undergone a remarkable renaissance. Incompatibilists, those who believe moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, have offered powerful new arguments in support of their views. Compatibilists, those who think moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, have responded with ingenious counterexamples and alternative accounts of responsibility. Despite the admirable elevation of complexity and subtlety within both camps, the trajectory of the literature is somewhat discouraging. Every dialectical stalemate between (...) incompatibilists and compatibilists seems to be superseded by a similar though often more subtle stalemate.1 The stalemates have two sources. On the one hand, incompatibilists again and again find powerful intuitive support from our folk concept. On the other hand, compatibilists seem right to insist that even if determinism were true, this would not mitigate our need for a concept of responsibility. (shrink)

Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility argues that the normative basis of moral responsibility is anchored in the effects of responsibility practices. Further, the capacities required for moral responsibility are socially scaffolded. This article considers criticisms of this account that have been recently raised by John Doris, Victoria McGeer, and Michael Robinson. Robinson argues against Building Better Beings’s rejection of libertarianism about free will, and the account of desert at stake in the theory. considers methodological questions that arise (...) from the account of desert, providing some additional resources for thinking about these issues within the framework of the account. McGeer objects to the particular mode of justification used to motivate the prescriptive aspect of the account. This article presents replies to each of these lines of response. (shrink)

In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...) particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think. (shrink)

This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness (...) of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility. (shrink)

The Luck Problem has existed in one form or another since David Hume, at least. It is perhaps as old as Stoic objections to the Epicurean swerve. Although the general issue admits of different formulations with subtly different emphases, the characterization of it that will serve as my target focuses on “cross-worlds” luck, a kind of luck that arises when the decision-making of agents is indeterministic.

The idea of moral responsibility is central to a wide range of our moral, social, and legal practices, and it underpins our basic notion of culpability. Yet the idea of moral responsibility is increasingly viewed with skepticism by researchers and scholars in psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and the law. Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility responds to these challenges, offering a new account of the justification of our practices and judgments of moral responsibility. Three distinctive ideas shape the account. (...) The first is the agency cultivation model, which holds that a system of responsibility practices can derive its justification from the way it supports our agency. The second idea, circumstantialism, is a new way of thinking about agential capacities. This is the view that the capacities required for moral responsibility are functions of agents in circumstances, rather than basic features of agents considered in themselves. The third idea is revisionism, or the idea that a satisfactory theory of moral responsibility will conflict with some aspects of ordinary commitments about freedom and moral responsibility. (shrink)

I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts of compatibilism, (...) and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will. (shrink)

Both legal and moral theorists have offered broadly “communicative” theories of criminal and moral responsibility. According to such accounts, we can understand the nature of responsibility by appealing to the idea that responsibility practices are in some fundamental sense expressive, discursive, or communicative. In this essay, I consider a variety of issues in connections with this family of views, including its relationship to free will, the theory of exemptions, and potential alternatives to the communicative model. Focusing on Michael McKenna’s Conversation (...) and Responsibility, I argue that communicative accounts, and the conversational model in particular, direct our attention to important and under-appreciated elements of our responsibility practices. However, rather than focusing on a model of conversation-as-address, as McKenna does, we do better to regard gossip as the paradigmatic conversational form that captures the main features of moral responsibility. (shrink)

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action (...) and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti-individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. (shrink)

A satisfactory construal of the subject matter of free will debates must allow for disagreements along two axes. First, it must allow for the possibility of higher order disagreements, or disagreements about what concepts, phenomena, or practices an account of free will is supposed to capture or explain. Second, it must allow for the fact of variation in the extent to which theories are bound by antecedent pre-philosophical thought, talk, and practices. A promising way of accommodating these two thoughts is (...) to treat free will in broadly functionalist terms. On the account proposed here, free will is a power that makes sense of everyday responsibility practices. This construal is not widely shared, but it allows for the possibility that we might have false beliefs about the nature of free will, while still making sense of central philosophical debates about free will. (shrink)

The idea of inclusive collective decision-making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation, which are commonly used in economics, have been criticised because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low-income earners who do not have the capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review, two deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is (...) grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasises argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and prerequisites, but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech, and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognises differences in the communicative capacities and practices of those who take part in deliberation, and so is better equipped to improve, though not to guarantee, inclusion. (shrink)

This paper proposes freedom as the condition of possibility for the construction of trust in human relationships. The methodology used is a review of the scientific literature of the most recent moral and political philosophy. As a result of the dialogue between different positions, it is discovered that freedom, despite being present in the act of trust, is forgotten in the discussion around trust, a forgetfulness that has as its main causes the assumption that trust is natural and the confusion (...) between the propensity to trust and the act of trusting. All this leads to proposing an approach of the act of trusting that starts from the freedom of the trustee and the trustor. (shrink)

Se define “iatrofilosofía” como la disciplina traslacional entre la medicina y la filosofía que tiene un doble objetivo, teórico y práctico. Se presenta un modelo de iatrofilosofía práctica aplicado al dolor crónico asociado a depresión y estrés —depresalgia— que expande al ámbito médico general la psicoterapia Fenomenológica, Hermenéutica Dinámica (PHD). Se parte del modelo general de la triada médica — patología (disease), padecimiento (illness) y condición de enfermo (sickness)— y, en el horizonte de la antropología de Ortega, se proponen cinco (...) metáforas nucleares: avaricia del cuerpo, angustia de circunstancia, desgarro personal, nudos personales y expropiación personal. Estas se relacionan con los mecanismos neurobiológicos de sensibilización central, alostasis y alteración del eje hipotálamo-hipófisis-suprarrenal. Se propone un proceso de recuperación personal basado en la concordia terapéutica. El análisis del dolor crónico y de otros problemas complejos de salud puede beneficiarse de metodologías filosóficas como la hermenéutica clínica. (shrink)

El texto presenta la crítica heideggeriana a los conceptos de teoría y praxis, tal como han sido acuñados por la tradición filosófica. El artículo muestra el giro transformador que hace el filósofo alemán en el tratamiento de estas dos nociones, con el fin de delinear una nueva concepción de filosofía, a propósito de la crítica y transformación de estas concepciones. La crítica se centra en señalar cómo en la tradición filosófica ha preponderado la teoría, comprendida desde una visión lógico – (...) racional, y la comprensión de la praxis como una instancia a-teórica, lo que deja de lado las consideraciones prácticas centrales y primarias implicadas en el pensar, y el ejercicio práctico como instancia comprensiva y de pensamiento. En este sentido, se muestra la reivindicación de la praxis, de la cotidianidad y de la situación fáctica como aspectos de central importancia en el ser del Dasein; y se plantea una nueva comprensión de lo que implica la teoría y las nuevas relaciones que se establecen en el nexo teoría – praxis como posibilidades del ser del Dasein, sin caer en el primado de la una sobre la otra, lo que implica la transformación de sus modos de comprensión. Finalmente, se muestra cómo un ejercicio filosófico desde estas intuiciones se encuentra más cercano a la comprensión e interpretación práctica que al desarrollo de teorías en el sentido clásico del término. (shrink)

I consider some themes and issues arising in recent work on moral responsibility, focusing on three recent books —Carlos Moya's Moral Responsibility, Al Mele's Free Will and Luck, and John Martin Fischer's My Way. I argue that these texts collectively suggest some difficulties with the way in which many issues are currently framed in the free will debates, including disputes about what constitutes compatibilism and incompatibilism and the relevance of intuitions and ordinary language for describing the metaphysics of free will (...) and moral responsibility. I also argue that each of the accounts raise more particular puzzles: it is unclear to what extent Moya’s account is properly an account of free will; Mele’s account raises questions about the significance of luck for compatibilist theories; and Fischer’s account of the value of responsibility as self-expression raises questions about the normative significance of moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a problem I call the “Conditional Position Problem” that arises for Ernest Sosa’s externalist epistemology. The problem is that, due to a phenomenon of epistemic circularity, one is unable to attain the reflective knowledge that one is justified in believing that perception is reliable, and is confined to the merely conditional position that one is so justified if perception is reliable. The problem is similar but different from a problem that Barry Stroud has tried to (...) formulate. However, because of space limitations I cannot explain in detail what makes the two problems different. The structure of the paper is as follows: first, I explain the structural features of Sosa’s epistemology that allow the problem to arise; I also describe the normative task that is thwarted by the Conditional Position Problem; then I expound the problem itself. I proceed to examine one response that Sosa can give based on a simple inferential manoeuvre and explain why that response fails; then I examine another response he can give based on a complex form of self-support, and explain why this response also fails. I conclude explaining why the problem I present is specifically a problem for externalism. In an appendix, I very briefly describe what I take to be the main reason that justifies my claim that Stroud's problem is not the same as the problem I develop. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la cristología de Thomas Hobbes con el propósito de entender una de las principales causas de su descrito como un pensador cristiano o, incluso, ateo, lo que afecta eventualmente la validez de su teología política. El autor sostiene que si bien Hobbes hace uso de la Biblia como fundamento de su filosofía política, su recepción del cristianismo en general no es enteramente correcta, debido a que está fuertemente influenciada por su decisión política en favor del absolutismo. Esta (...) posición política lo lleva a escoger textos ad-hoc que apoyan su teoría y a rechazar otros que no lo hacen, dejando así fuera importantes aspectos del cristianismo, uno de los cuales, el más central, es la naturaleza de Jesucristo como Dios-hombre y la interpretación contractualista del federalismo judío. El artículo hace uso de estudios de reconocidos investigadores (Elazar, Pangle, Kraynak, Ratzinger entre otros) y el autor concluye que Hobbes exhibe una visión reduccionista del cristianismo que influye en su teología política. (shrink)

The only test theory used by workers in the field of testing special relativity to analyze the significance of their experiments is the proof by H. P. Robertson [Rev. Mod. Phys. 21, 378 (1949)] of the Lorentz transformations from the results of the experimental evidence. Some researchers would argue that the proof contains an unwarranted assumption disguised as a convention about synchronization procedures. Others would say that alternative conventions are possible. In the present paper, no convention is used, but the (...) Lorentz transformations are still obtained using only the results of the experiments in Robertson's proof, namely the Michelson-Morley, Kennedy-Thorndike, and Ives-Stilwell experiments. Thus the revised proof is a valid test theory which is independent of any conventions, since one appeals only to the experimental evidence. The analysis of that evidence shows the directions in which efforts to test special relativity should go. Finally it is shown how the resulting test theory still has to be improved for consistency in the analysis of experiments with complicated experimental setups, how it can be simplified for expediency as to what should be tested, and how it should be completed for a missing step not considered by Robertson. (shrink)

The energy-momentum relationship is obtained in para-Lorentzian dynamics. It is shown that the well-known correspondence rule for the operators energy and momentum holds in any inertial system if it is assumed to hold in the preferred reference frame. The new Dirac equation is obtained. Some qualitative features of the new theory are given; one of then is the spontaneous appearance of conserved-vector and nonconserved-axial weak currents. Finally one evaluates the convenience of further developments of the present theory in view of (...) the excellent agreement of QED with experiment. (shrink)

In recent years, animal welfare has become an important element of sustainable production that has evolved along with the transformation of animal production systems. Consumer attitudes towards farm animal welfare are changing around the world, especially at emerging markets of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Survey-based research on consumer attitudes towards farm animal welfare has increased. However, the geographical coverage of studies on consumer attitudes and perceptions about farm animal welfare has mostly been limited to Europe, and North America. Until (...) now, Latin American consumers’ attitudes towards animal welfare have not been well studied. Despite the fact that Mexico, Chile and Brazil belong to the same region, there are marked differences between these countries in terms of their economical and geographical characteristics among other factors. Those differences potentially have an impact on consumer attitudes towards animal welfare and livestock production systems in general. Given the evidence from the literature review, it seems advisable that Latin American producers and food industry who engage in animal welfare-enhancing practices should clearly label their products with information on the type of husbandry system to reach those consumers who want to make an informed choice. Therefore, there are some aspects that need to be studied and cannot be worked separately in order to promote and understand consumer attitudes towards dairy and beef systems, such as geography, economic development, and politics. (shrink)

In post-Revolutionary Mexico, the Indian was conceptualized as a problem that needed to be solved. Indians were believed to be weighing down the nation and thought to constitute an obstacle for fulfilling its promised modern future. Thus, the scientific study of indigenous peoples in Mexico became, in the 1930s, a focus of anthropologists, physicians, and other experts, who sought to learn more about indigenous populations in order to solve this "problem." In this paper I explore how this "problem-solving" was practiced, (...) how and why particular groups of people were used as subjects of inquiry and intervention, how they were selected, and how they enabled the production of knowledge deemed useful to... (shrink)

Depois da sua passagem para a fé católica, Edith Stein reformulou suas concepções filosóficas apropriando-se do conceitual tomasiano. Neste artigo, abordaremos como ela abordou as questões acerca da eternidade do ser e da criação dos entes, comparando com a concepção original de Tomás de Aquino e mostrando como esse diálogo entre os pensamentos medievais e contemporâneos foi desenvolvido de uma maneira original na obra “Ser finito e ser eterno: Ensaio de uma ascensão ao sentido do ser”.

There is a phrase by Paul Klee that insists and repeats itself in Deleuze's writing: "We are missing this last force. We are missing a people". However, the contemporary world is defined precisely by the fullness and the becoming population of peoples. This is why the concept of people constitutes an amphibology that is revealed in Deleuze's work as an appearance between people and thought. In this sense, the relationship between both concepts shows a set of aesthetic, political, and ontological (...) consequences that these notes attempt to address in Deleuze's thought and beyond. Hay una frase de Paul Klee que insiste y se repite en la mano de Deleuze: “Nos falta esta última fuerza. Nos falta un pueblo”. Sin embargo, el mundo contemporáneo se define justamente por el lleno y el devenir población de los pueblos. Es por esto que el concepto de pueblo constituye una anfibología que se revela en el trabajo de Deleuze como una comparecencia entre pueblo y pensamiento. En este sentido, la relación entre ambas categorías muestran un conjunto de consecuencias estéticas, políticas y ontológicas que estas notan intentan abordar en el pensamiento de Deleuze y más allá de éste. (shrink)

The precise conceptions of race de­ployed by Mexican philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century have often been poorly understood. Consequently, the specifi­cally racial components in their work have been frequently dismissed on the grounds that they were unscientific, irresponsible, and/or sloppy. I hope to show that with a sufficiently rich understanding of at least the seminal works many of these criticisms can be blunted.

It is sometimes instructive to reflect on a problem as it appeared before our current philosophical presumptions became ingrained. In this context, Maurice Mandelbaum’s “Determinism and Moral Responsibility” is of particular interest. Published in 1960, it appeared only a few years before the wave of work that gave us much of our contemporary understanding of moral responsibility, free will, and determinism. Mandelbaum’s account repays reconsideration. Mandelbaum argues that (1) there is an underappreciated threat to “determinist” or compatibilist accounts of responsibility, (...) and (2) this threat can be met with a suitable compatibilist account of the etiology of action. (shrink)

After reviewing the foundations of special relativity and the room left for rival theories, a set of nonrelativistic para-Lorentzian transformations is derived uniquely, based on (a) a weaker first principle, (b) the requirement that the transformations sought do not give rise to the clock “paradox” (in a refined version), and (c) the compliance of the transformations with the classical experiments of Michelson-Morley, Kennedy-Thorndike, and Ives-Stilwell. The corresponding dynamics is developed. Most of the experimental support of special relativity is reconsidered in (...) the light of the new theory. It is concluded that the relativity of simultaneity has so far not been tested. (shrink)

This paper develops the conjecture that the electromagnetic interaction is the manifestation of the torsion Ωμ of spacetime. This conjecture is made feasible by the natural separation of the connection ω μ v into “gravitational” and “electromagnetic” parts α μ v and β μ v , respectively, related to the metric and to the torsion. When α μ v is neglected in front of β μ v , the affine geodesics are shown to become the equations of motion of charged (...) particles with Lorentz force, for an appropriate choice of Ωμ. Since β μ v contains the factor q/m, neutral particles do not see the torsional part of the connection and behave as if Ωμ were zero, i.e., as in Einstein's theory of gravity (the same effect is obviously obtained for charged particles when β μ v 《 α μ v ).In addition to the factor q/m, the velocity of the test particle appears in Ωμ. This indicates that the appropriate context for this problem is to be found in velocity-dependent connections. The velocities are now coordinates and become the actual velocities of the test particles only in the system of equations that one solves for obtaining the affine geodesics in connections of this type.When written with differential forms, the combination of Maxwell's equations and of the pertinent form of the torsion suggests geometric field equations for electrodynamics. As for the gravitational part of the connection, it can be made to obey equations similar in form to the Einstein field equations. A unified geometric theory of electrodynamics and gravitation spontaneously emerges. The present state of the theory does not yet permit us to ascertain whether the right-hand side of the fully geometric, gravitational field equations corresponds to the energy-momentum tensor. (shrink)

Se presenta el reporte de una intervención docente para la enseñanza de la ética en la Educación Media Superior a través del enfoque por competencias. Primero, se contextualiza y problematiza sobre la Reforma Integral de la Educación Media Superior que tuvo lugar en México en el 2008, para observar los cambios curriculares y señalar el lugar de la ética como asignatura en este subsistema y los retos de los profesores frente a estos cambios. Segundo, se presentan los principios teóricos del (...) enfoque por competencias, así como una perspectiva filosófica sobre la enseñanza de la ética basada en la phrónesis, que desde una perspectiva aristotélica es traducida como prudencia, como modelo de ser ético. Tercero, se expone el diseño didáctico, así como los resultados que muestran las experiencias del docente en el aula, el trabajo de los alumnos y los resultados de los procesos de aprendizaje. En la conclusión se analiza el impacto del enfoque por competencias en la enseñanza de la ética, señalando las dificultades y limitaciones, pero también sus posibilidades para el trabajo docente al vincularse con concepciones filosóficas más amplias. (shrink)